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A THOUSAND CLONES: THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION IN THE "LOOK AND FEEL" OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS-Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone
Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
Personal computers are a part of daily life. Once entrusted to spe-
cialists, computers are now used by persons with little or no computer
training and little time to learn. Easy-to-use computer programs are
in demand.' In fact, the "user interface" (or "look and feel")2 is the
single most important factor in the marketability of a computer
program.
The software industry is in conflict over copyright protection of the
user interface.4 On one hand, developers of popular programs favor
copyright protection because a well- designed interface assures market
success.5 On the other hand, competitors deny that the user interface
should receive copyright protection because of the public interest in
1. B. SHNEIDERMAN, DESIGNING THE USER INTERFACE: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE
HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION at v, 17-18, 28-29 (1987); 'Look and Feel' Discussed As
Major Copyright Issue, INFOWORLD, Nov. 11, 1985, at 13; Dean, Simplify, Simplify, Simplify,
BYTE, Dec. 1983, at 161; cf The Difficult Path to the Easy-to-Use Computer, Bus. WK., Feb. 27,
1984, at 93.
2. "User interface" is "[a] term used to describe any way in which a user accesses a computer
system, for example, through a visual display unit, a personal computer or a videotex terminal."
A. CHANDOR, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS 472 (3d ed. 1985) (emphasis omitted).
The "user interface" is often called the "look and feel" of a program. See, e.g., Smith &
Elgison, DCA v. Softlone: The Continuing Saga of Copyright, Computers, and Clones,
COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1987, at 13. The term "look and feel" has also been used to denote
copyright protection which extends beyond verbatim copying. See, e.g., Note, Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: "Look and Feel" Copyright Protection for the Display
Screens of an Application Microcomputer Program, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105
(1987); cf infra note 66 ("total concept and feel" discussed as standard of infringement). To
avoid confusion, this Note will avoid the term.
3. The Difficult Path to the Easy-to-Use Computer, supra note 1, at 93.
4. In January 1987, Lotus Development Corporation began an infringement action against
two manufacturers of spreadsheet programs which duplicated the screen displays and command
codes of the Lotus 1-2-3 program. Warner, Lotus Says It May File for Injunction To Halt Sales of
1-2-3 Work-Alikes: Company Sues for Copyright Infringement, INFOWORLD, Jan. 19, 1987, at 1.
The suit divided the industry. The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
("ADAPSO"), an industry trade association, refused to take a position on the suit because of the
conflict between two goals sought by the association: protection of property rights and
standardization. Adapso Split Over the Lotus Copyright Suit, INFOWORLD, Apr. 6, 1987, at 9.
The Copyright Office refused to issue a separate registration for Lotus 1-2-3's screen displays.
Infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
5. See Lotus Believes That Innovation, Not Imitation, Deserves Reward, INFOWORLD, Mar.
30, 1987, at 8 (statement ofJ. Manzi, president and CEO, Lotus Development Corp.).
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"standardization." 6 The developers of "clones," programs which
emulate the user interface of popular programs, argue that computer
users are best served if they can purchase competing programs without
having to learn different interfaces.7
In Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing
Corp.,' the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia rejected "standardization" as a reason to deny copyright pro-
tection to user interface design. The court also rejected the proposi-
tion, advanced six months earlier in Broderbund Software, Inc. v.
Unison World, Inc.,9 that copyright protection of the underlying com-
puter program extends to the screen displays generated by that pro-
gram. Once it found the screen displays to be separately
copyrightable, the Softklone court evaluated each feature of the dis-
play individually, and extended copyright protection to some elements
of the user interface. Although the court erroneously refused to pro-
tect the program's command language, it properly affirmed broad pro-
tection for the user interface of computer programs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Computer Programs and the User Interface
1. Computer Programs
The Copyright Act" defines a computer program as "a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result."" There are two types of pro-
grams: system programs and application programs. System programs
together constitute an operating system. The operating system con-
trols the interaction between hardware elements and establishes the
environment in which an application program functions.' 2 Applica-
tion programs, which this Note principally addresses, perform a spe-
6. Standardization implies the free use of established user interfaces by competing programs
to allow easy transfer of skills from one program to another. See infra notes 153-56 and
accompanying text.
7. See You Cannot Copyright Ideas, Paperback Asserts, INFOWORLD, Mar. 30, 1987, at 8
(statement of A. Osborne, president and CEO, Paperback Software International).
8. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
9. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This definition was added by the Computer Software Copyright
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028.
12. A. CHANDOR, supra note 2, at 331-33; see Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983) (operating system programs "generally manage the internal
functions of the computer or facilitate use of application programs"), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984).
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cific task for the user. 3 For example, application programs include
data base management, spreadsheet, and word processing programs.
2. The User Interface
The user interface' 4 is the means by which a computer and a user
communicate with each other. The application software controls this
dialogue.'" Although inextricably linked, the program and user inter-
face are also conceptually distinct because the same interface can be
generated by different programs.
16
A common medium of computer-to-user communication is the
video display unit. 7 This unit displays information in either graphic
or textual form. The user typically communicates to the computer by
use of a typewriter-like keyboard or by use of a "mouse."'1
8
Basic interface styles include menus, command languages, and
direct manipulation techniques. 19 Menus2° display choices available
to the user on the video screen. The program solicits and acts on the
user's response. An elaborate type of menu is the "form fill-in."2
Used for data entry, the program displays a blank form on screen,
frequently accompanied by instructions explaining what each field 22
should contain. The user then fills in individual fields.
Command languages23 are sets of instructions which permit the user
to instruct the program to behave in a certain way. The program must
13. 1 D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 2.06[2], at 2-114, 2-117 (1986); see Franklin Computer,
714 F.2d at 1243 ("Application programs usually perform a specific task for the computer user,
such as word processing, checkbook balancing, or playing a game.").
14. See supra note 2.
15. Software plays an indispensable role. The program instructs the computer what to
display on the video display unit. I D. BENDER, supra note 13, § 2.05[2], at 2-65 to -66. "It is the
program, and only the program, which controls the computer's activities. The program specifies
uniquely the sequence of operations which the computer will perform. The computer has no
'mind of its own'; rather, the program serves as its mind, telling it what to do." Id. § 2.03[1], at
2-10 (footnote omitted).
16. Cf infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
17. A display unit contains a cathode ray tube (much like a television) which displays text or
graphics generated from data stored in the main memory of a computer. See A. CHANDOR,
supra note 2, at 480 (emphasis omitted).
18. A "mouse" is "[a] device whose movements on a flat surface are reflected by cursor
movements on a visual display unit, thus obviating the need for a keyboard." A. CHANDOR,
supra note 2, at 308 (emphasis in original).
19. See generally B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1, at 57-60.
20. See generally id. at 59, 86-128.
21. See generally id. at 59, 122-28.
22. A field is "[a] subdivision of a record containing a unit of information. For example, a
payroll record might have the following fields: clock number, gross pay, deductions, net pay." A.
CHANDOR, supra note 2, at 184 (emphasis in original).
23. See generally B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1, at 59-60, 136-72.
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recognize commands, accept properly formatted commands, and act
upon them. The commands do not necessarily appear on the screen.
Direct manipulation24 of the screen display is a third major user
interface style. Perhaps the best illustration of direct manipulation is
the arcade videogame. In a videogame, the screen's images change
immediately in reaction to the user's movement of a joystick or push
of a button. In a word processing program, a user edits by moving a
cursor through the displayed text. The displayed text changes imme-
diately in response to a correction. By contrast, older line editors
required the use of a command language. The user specified a line
number and typed a command which instructed the computer to make
the requested change.
B. Computers and Copyright
Copyright law seeks to achieve progress in the arts and sciences25 by
balancing two interests: protection and competition.2 6 In pursuing
this goal, the author's rights must be sufficiently protected to
encourage the development of new works.2 ' However, the protection
afforded must not be so broad that competition is stifled.2 8 With the
24. See generally id. at 60, 180-219.
25. The Constitution authorizes Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1235, 1237 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
27. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
28. Analysis of these factors may lead to the conclusion that copyright protection should not
be afforded at all. The right vested in the copyright owner is not absolute. Rewarding the author
has been called a "secondary consideration." Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158 (1947). The
monopoly granted by copyright may be so strong that competition will be suppressed and prices
kept artificially high.
However, when considering the propriety of extending copyright protection to computer
programs, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU") found that the copyright monopoly would not significantly impair competition
within the computer software industry. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU) FINAL REPORT 23-25 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU
FINAL REPORT]. And, even if this were not the case, CONTU concluded:
On the whole, the direct approach against alleged monopolists seems far superior to
fighting perceived economic evils on copyright grounds. The enforcement and, where
necessary, emendation of the present antitrust laws is more appropriate to the problem, if
any, than the invention of a class of works which are generally copyrightable but not when
their authors are disfavored, for whatever well-intentioned reasons.
Id. at 25.
Furthermore, even where copyright protection is extended, competition may be preserved by
recognizing only verbatim or near-verbatim copying as infringement. See infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
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exception of text-based screen displays, the basic question of
copyrightability of computer programs and output has generally been
resolved in favor of protection. The courts now seek to determine
what scope of protection is most conducive to maintaining
competition.
1. Establishing Protection: Computer Programs and Output as
Copyrightable Works
The 1976 Copyright Act29 is purposefully broad in its definition of
copyrightable matter. The Act protects "original works of author-
ship."3 Among the classes of protected works31 are literary works,32
audiovisual works,33 and compilations.3 4 Computer programs are pro-
tected as literary works.3" In a series of videogame cases, screen dis-
plays generated by the underlying computer program were held
separately copyrightable as audiovisual works.3 6
29. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
30. Id. § 102(a). The term "original works of authorship" was intentionally left undefined.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5664.
A copied work is not original. A work must originate with the author. Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). Some courts have construed authorship to
require a modicum of creativity. See, eg., Original Appalachian Artworks v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d
821, 824-25 (11th Cir. 1982); see also I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 2.02[A], at 2-14
to -15 (1987); A. LATMAN, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 23-24 nn.29-32 (6th ed. 1986).
While the threshold quantum of creative effort required for copyrightability is generally low, 684
F.2d at 824, copyright has been denied to simple words and phrases, see, e.g., O'Brien v. Chappel
& Co., 159 F. Supp. 58, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (words "night and noon" in lyrics of a song), and to
blank forms, see, e-g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1880) (accounting forms). In no sense,
however, do originality and creativity connote novelty in the patent law sense, 1 M. NIMMER,
supra, 2.02[A], at 2-6 to -8, 2-10; H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra, at 51; nor are ingenuity or
aesthetic merit required, id.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
32. "Literary works" are works expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia. Id. § 101.
33. "Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a "series of related images" intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devices, together with accompanying sounds. Id. The term
"images" is not defined by the Act.
34. Id. § 103. A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. Id. § 101. Compilations
are protected only to the extent of the author's contribution to the work. Id. § 103.
35. Infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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a. Computer Programs
Computer programs are protected by copyright as literary works.3 7
While the utilitarian nature of programs caused great difficulty for
copyright theorists38 and the first courts to consider program
copyrightability, 39 courts now regard the issue of copyrightability as
foreclosed by passage of the Computer Software Copyright Act of
1980.40 Current litigation focuses on how far beyond literal copying of
the program code infringement will be found.4 While recent deci-
sions have afforded expansive protection to programs, courts have gen-
erally agreed that a program copyright does not protect the screens
generated by the program.4 2
The text of the Act appears to limit the protection afforded by a
program copyright registration solely to infringement of the program
code. The Act defines "computer program" as a "set of statements or
instructions to be used ... in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result."'4 3 The protectable work is this set of instructions. The
result which these instructions bring about, whether a screen display
or printout, is a separate issue. The Final Report of the Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU")4
supports this conclusion. CONTU stressed that copyright protection
of programs would not prevent another developer from creating a pro-
37. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 54. Computer programs are protected whether
they are application programs or system programs. See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (systems program), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (application
program).
38. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 26-27, 36-37 (concurring opinion of
Comm'r Nimmer and dissenting opinion of Comm'r Hersey); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The
Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine- Readable Form. 1984
DUKE L.J. 663. Utilitarian works have traditionally been protected by patent, not copyright,
law. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra, at 26-27 (concurring opinion of Comm'r Nimmer).
39. See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 813-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d 49 Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Data
Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-69 (N.D. II1. 1979), aff d on other grounds.
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
40. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)); see, e.g.. Apple
Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984); Franklin Computer. 714 F.2d
at 1247-48.
41. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.)
(infringement found in substantial similarity of structure and sequence of dental office records
program; discussed infra notes 69-72, 81-87 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
(1986).
42. See infra note 52.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
44. CONTU was established to study, inter alia, whether copyright was an appropriate means
to protect computer programs. CONTU FINAl. REPORT. supra note 28, at 3, 6.
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gram which accomplished the same result if the developer did not
copy the first program's code."5 One task a program instructs the
computer to do is create the screen display.46
The videogame cases47 support the conclusion that screen displays
generated by a program are not protected by the underlying program
copyright. In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,a" the Second Circuit
found that the program copyright would not protect the screen dis-
plays.49 A program copyright could not prevent a competitor from
developing a non-infringing "knock-off" which precisely replicated
the sights and sounds of the videogame5 0 "Such replication is possi-
ble because many different computer programs can produce the same
'results,' whether those results are an analysis of financial records or a
sequence of images and sounds. A program is simply 'a set of state-
ments ... or instructions . . .,. 11 The work protected by the program
copyright is the set of instructions, not the resulting displays.
The cases decided since Stern have generally concurred that the pro-
gram copyright does not protect against duplication of screen dis-
plays. 2 Therefore, the protection of screen displays depends upon
whether the displays independently qualify as copyrightable "works"
under the Act.
45. Id. at 21.
46. See supra note 15.
47. See, eg., Frybarger v. International Business Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'g 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Williams Elecs. v. Artie Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Stern
Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982), affrg 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Nintendo of Am. v. Elcon
Indus., 564 F. Supp. 937 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai- Am., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J.
1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
48. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 855. In several of the early videogame cases, the plaintiffs had not registered the
underlying computer program for copyright, perhaps because of the uncertain status of copyright
protection for programs. The defendants argued that the actions for audiovisual copyright
infringement in fact sought indirectly to protect the unregistered program. See, e.g., id.;
Amusenent World, 547 F. Supp. at 226; Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 481.
50. 669 F.2d at 855.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1244 (3d Cir.)
(recognizing that screens and program are distinct works, protectable under different
copyrights), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986); Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 481.
In Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986), the
court cited Whelan for the proposition that a program copyright extended protection to screen
displays. Whelan, however, recognized the reverse: the program and displays are separate works.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244.
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b. Output
The videogame cases established that the computer-generated
screen displays of videogames are separately copyrightable as audiovi-
sual works.53 In Stern, for example, the court found that the repeating
images displayed in the course of the videogame Scrambler met the
Act's definition of an audiovisual work (a "series of related images"54)
and were eligible for separate copyright protection."
Although the graphics-laden screens generated by videogames are
separately copyrightable as audiovisual works, text-based screens are
not. The Copyright Office interprets the statutory definition of an
audiovisual work to include only "related images that are pictorial or
graphic."56 Works consisting wholly of text are expressly excluded.5"
Alternatively, text-only screens might be separately copyrightable as
literary works. At one time, the Copyright Office issued separate
registrations for text-based screens as "compilations of program
terms."58 However, it has now suspended that practice.59
The Copyright Office recently threw into doubt the separate
copyrightability of text-based screen displays under any classification.
In early 1987, it denied an application for a separate audiovisual copy-
right registration for the screen displays generated by Lotus Develop-
ment Corporation's spreadsheet program, Lotus 1-2-3.6" The
Copyright Office stated in its denial that "textual screen displays
embodied within the computer program that generates them are cov-
ered by the registration for the programs, without either the need or
justification for separate registration for the displays."'" While Lotus
had sought an audiovisual copyright registration, the reasons given for
denial appear equally applicable to separate registration of text-based
screen displays under any other classification, including compilations
or literary works. The Copyright Office has now undertaken a review
of its registration practices, including separate registration of both
53. See. e.g., supra note 47.
54. Supra note 33.
55. 669 F.2d at 855.
56. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR R49 at 2 (1986) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 453
(N.D. Ga. 1987).
59. 33 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 613 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 613-14. "Under present practices.., the Office does not register separately textual
screen displays, reasoning that there is no authorship in ideas, or the format or arrangement of
text, and that any literary authorship in the screen display would presumably be covered by the
underlying computer program-itself a literary work." Notice of Public Hearing, Registration
and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 52 Fed. Reg. 28311, 28312 (1987).
202
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text-based and graphic screens.62
2. Preserving Competition: Defining the Scope of Protection
If a work is copyrightable, suit may be brought for infringement of
the rights secured by copyright,63 including the right to reproduce the
work." In order to prove infringement of this right, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant copied from the work, and that the copying
resulted in improper appropriation. 65 Generally, improper appropria-
tion is found if the works are substantially similar in the eyes of the
ordinary observer.66
62. Notice of Public Hearing, Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 52
Fed. Reg. 28311, 28312 (1987) (affecting 37 C.F.R. pt. 202) (to be held September 9, 1987). The
questions to be addressed included "first, whether or not the Office should register any screen
displays separately from the underlying computer programs that generate them; and, second,
what the Office should require as the deposit if any registration is made for screen displays either
separately or as part of a computer program." Id. As this Note was being prepared for
publication, public comment and testimony had been taken, but a decision seemed unlikely prior
to 1988. Telephone interview with Elliot Alderman, attorney, Copyright Office (Nov. 2, 1987).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982). As a prerequisite to suit, a plaintiff must obtain a certificate of
registration of copyright. Id. § 411. Once obtained, a certificate of registration is prima facie
evidence of copyrightability, originality, and conformance with statutory.prerequisites, including
notice. Id. § 410(c). If the Copyright Office refuses the application, an author may nonetheless
file suit if notice is served upon the Register, who may become a party to the action. Id. § 411.
64. InL § 106(1).
65. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
Copying is usually shown by proof of access and similarity between the works. A. LATMAN,
supra note 30, at 192-96. Access is seldom disputed, so infringement litigation usually focuses on
the similarity between the works.
66. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (L. Hand,
J.). Infringement exists if "an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having
been appropriated from the copyrighted work." Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021,
1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
Analysis or dissection of the work is permissible and expert testimony admissible on the
question of copying. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. However, dissection and expert analysis have
generally not been permitted to prove improper appropriation. Id.; Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). Shunning detailed
lists of similarities and dissimilarities, courts have asked whether the alleged infringer has
captured the "total concept and feel" of the pirated work. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
In Roth, the defendant was found to have copied plaintiff's greeting cards. The inscribed
phrase of each card was in the public domain and hence noncopyrightable. Considering the
artwork of each card apart from the inscription, the court did not find sufficient similarity for
infringement. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that "proper analysis of the problem requires
that all elements of each card, including text, arrangement of text, art work, and association
between art work and text, be considered as a whole." 429 F.2d at 1109.
One interpretation of Roth is that nonprotectable matter need not be factored out before
application of the ordinary observer test. A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, however, rejected
this perception of Roth. It held that, in the context of a compilation of otherwise nonprotectable
elements, "[w~hat is important is not whether there is substantial similarity in the total concept
and feel of the works,... but whether the very small amount of protectible expression in Cooling
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Substantial similarity depends upon the quantity and quality of the
material copied; 67 copying need not be verbatim. 68  For example, in
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 69 the evi-
dence showed similarity of screen displays, data file structures, and
five major subroutines." The defendant argued that the proof was
insufficient, characterizing the five subroutines as " 'a small fraction of
the two works.' ""7 The court found it unnecessary to consider the
entirety of the two works before finding infringement. Instead, the
court made a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about the charac-
ter of the work as a whole and the importance of the substantially
similar portions of the work.7 2
The substantial similarity required to show infringement must be of
protectable matter.73 Copyright protects only the expression of ideas,
not the ideas themselves.7 4 Other authors may use ideas embodied in
a copyrighted work if they express those ideas in a sufficiently different
manner.7 5 Therefore, if two works are similar solely because the ideas
Systems' catalog is substantially similar to the equivalent portions of Stuart's catalog." Cooling
Sys. & Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1985).
Roth has also been cited to support the proposition that copyright protection extends beyond
literal copying. See, e.g., Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167. In this, Roth is unexceptional. Copyright has
long protected against nonliteral copying. See infra note 68.
Several courts have rejected the ordinary observer test in computer program infringement
actions to the extent that it forbids dissection and expert testimony because program code
analysis is complex. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-35 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986).
67. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 30, 13.03[A], at 13-36 to -38.1. A borrowed sentence or
paragraph may be of so little import that the copying will be held de minimis and no
infringement found. See, e.g., Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 481 F. Supp. 647, 650
(D.D.C. 1979) (two sentences), aff'd, 675 F.12d 1340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909
(1982). On the other hand, in an exceptional case appropriating a single phrase or sentence may
constitute infringement if the effect is to diminish or injure the original work. 3 M. NIMMER,
supra, 13.03[A], at 13-40.
68. Copyright protects against more than verbatim copying. If this were not so, "a plagiarist
would escape by immaterial variations." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930). However, as one departs further from the literal text, the competing principle
that copyright does not protect ideas comes into play. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying
text.
69. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986).
70. Id. at 1242-46.
71. Id. at 1245.
72. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
73. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 841 (1980): A.
LATMAN, supra note 30, at 197.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1880).
75. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied. 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
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they express are similar, infringement will not be found.7 6
The "merger" doctrine is a corollary of this restriction. Where an
idea may only be expressed in one way, idea and expression are said to
"merge," and no infringement will be found." Otherwise, copyright
would permit monopolization of the underlying idea.7" Even if an idea
may be expressed in more than one way, the range of expression avail-
able may be so limited that a court may require verbatim copying
before it finds infringement.79
Identifying the idea or ideas expressed in a work is a difficult task. °
Generally, courts use two approaches. First, a single idea may be
found to underlie the entire work. Second, particular elements of a
work may be identified as distinct, nonprotected ideas. If the similar-
ity between works is due solely to the commonality of the idea or ideas
embodied in the work, no infringement will be found.
The court applied the first approach in Whelan, and found substan-
tial similarity in the structure and sequence of the programs.8 " The
76. See supra note 73.
77. See, eg., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971) (jeweled bee pin).
78. Id.; cf Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)
(protection denied altogether where means of expression was limited).
79. Fact-based and scientific works, for example, are frequently afforded only narrow
copyright protection:
One consequence of the policy in favor of free use of ideas is that the degree of substantial
similarity required to show infringement varies according to the type of work and the ideas
expressed in it.... Some ideas can be expressed in myriad ways, while others allow only a
narrow range of expression. Fictional works generally fall into the first category....
Factual works are different. Subsequent authors wishing to express the ideas contained in
a factual work often can choose from only a narrow range of expression....
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1037 (1984); see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62,
65 (3d Cir. 1978) (ornithological convention found to limit manner in which two cardinals could
be represented in painting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1982); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio,
203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 132 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (instructional materials; "in teaching, a noticea-
ble style is a hindrance. Two simple and straightforward explanations of an economic law or
principle must bear a close resemblance, so greater similarity must be allowed."); Gorman, Copy-
right Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963).
The range of expression also may be limited by the function a work is to serve. See, e.g., Plains
Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (computer
program's structure may be dictated by externalities of cotton commodities market; discussed
infra note 87), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987); see also Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing
Aides Corp., 497 F. Supp. 154, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 657 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1981)
(instructions for cutting and hanging draperies found largely dictated by function).
80. Judge Learned Hand recognized that the distinction between idea and expression is
largely ad hoc. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
81. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-42, 1248 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986). The programs were in different languages, making literal
similarity of program code impossible. Id. at 1226.
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defendant argued that the structure of a program is by definition its
idea and hence not protectable.8" The court rejected this argument.8 3
It held that thepurpose or function of a utilitarian work is the work's
idea. 4 The evidence showed that the function performed by the pro-
gram in question 85 could be implemented through a variety of different
structures. 86 Therefore, the court held the structure to be protectable
expression.87
The court applied the second technique in Frybarger v. International
Business Machines Corp. 88 Rather than attempting to define a single
abstract idea underlying the videogames in question, the court found
that various features constituted distinct, nonprotectable ideas.89 The
court refused to protect the entire game because whatever expression
remained after these ideas were eliminated was as a practical matter
indispensable to the ideas expressed.9"
82. Id. at 1235.
83. Id. at 1235-42.
84. Id. at 1236. The sense in which the Whelan court uses the term "utilitarian" is unclear.
The court did not define the term, but used the term to distinguish the program from a work of
fiction. Id. at 1238.
85. In Whelan, the "idea" underlying the program was to "aid in the business operations of a
dental laboratory." 797 F.2d at 1238.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1239. The court in Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807
F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987), rejected Whelan's holding that
copyright necessarily protected against copying of a program's structure. The defendants in
Plains Cotton presented evidence that "many of the similarities between the ... programs are
dictated by the externalities of the cotton market." Id., 807 F.2d at 1262. Therefore, the court
upheld denial of a preliminary injunction. The Whelan court also cautioned that structure and
sequence might not be protected where the idea underlying the program was to perform a
function in a certain way. 797 F.2d at 1238 n.34. It gave no guidance, however, as to when this
would be the case.
The Whelan court's approach is similar to the abstractions test developed by Judge Learned
Hand for use in determining when nonverbatim copying of a work of fiction would amount to
infringement:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
88. 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 530. These "ideas" included the display of straight rows of pivot points on a solid
colored background; solid lines connecting two pivot points; a single protagonist with legs and a
face. Id. at 529-30 n.2. Eight more ideas were identified. Id.
90. Id. at 530. The court characterized this expression as unprotectable sclnes dfaire.
In fiction works, copyright protection has been denied to so-called scenes d faire, that is,
"incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of a given topic." Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs.
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C. Copyright Protection of the User Interface
Copyright protection for the user interface is complicated because
the interface does not itself constitute a "work." Under current regis-
tration practices and case law, each element of the interface can be
protected only as a part of another work. The underlying program is
one work;9' screen displays with sufficient graphic content are sepa-
rately copyrightable as audiovisual works;92 text-based screens may
not be separately copyrightable at all. 93 Whether such basic interface
styles as menus and interaction can be protected depends upon the
separate copyrightability of the screen display. Command languages
not displayed on screen depend upon the program copyright for
protection.
Copyrightability and scope of protection for the screen displays gen-
erated by a non-videogame application program were first considered
in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.94 Broderbund was
an action for infringement of the screen displays of a menu-driven
printing program called Print Shop.95 Although principally text-based,
the Copyright Office issued a separate registration for the displays as
an audiovisual work.96 While holding the screens to be protectable, the
Broderbund court did not clearly base its decision on the program or
the audiovisual registration. The court cited Whelan for the proposi-
tion that "copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a
computer program, but rather that it extends to the overall structure
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.) (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). Thus, in a novel about the antebellum South, incidents
concerning the ill-treatment of slaves would be considered scines dfaire. See, eg., Alexander,
460 F. Supp. at 45. Professor Nimmer has criticized this statement of the doctrine to the extent
that it excludes expression merely because it is "standard" to a given topic. Original but
hackneyed prose, he contends, is still protectable. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 30, 13.03[A at 13-
32 to -33 n.43. The doctrine has also been criticized as permitting the subjective opinions of
judges as to what is "standard" or "indispensable" to limit the scope of protection. Tamura,
Copyright Infringement: An Argument for the Elimination of the Scenes d Faire Doctrine, 5
COMM/ENT LJ. 147 (1982).
Despite criticism, the doctrine was used in several videogame cases to define which elements of
screen displays were copyrightable expression and which were nonprotectable ideas, or scnes
faire. See, eg., Frybarger v. International Business Machines Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1987); North Am. Philips, 672 F.2d at 616-17. To the extent that screen displays of other
application programs include a fictive element, the doctrine may have application. The doctrine
might even be applied to entirely utilitarian works.
91. Supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
92. Supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
93. Supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
94. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
95. Id. at 1129-30.
96. Siegel & Derwin, Copyright Infringement of the "Look and Feel" of an Operating System
by Its Own Applications Programs, COMPUTER LAW., Jan. 1987, at 5.
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of a program, including its audiovisual displays."97 However, the
court also identified the action to be for "audiovisual copyright
infringement."98 Since the court's analysis focused not on the pro-
gram code but on a visual comparison of the screens, the court appar-
ently based its decision on infringement of the audiovisual copyright,
not the program copyright. The decision may thus be read to mean
that menu-driven screen displays containing sufficient graphic content
are protectable as audiovisual works.
The defendants in Broderbund argued that the menu screens, input
formats, and sequencing of screens were nonprotectable because of
merger.99 They claimed that any menu-driven program which
allowed the user to print greeting cards, banners, and posters would
have menu screens, input formats, and sequencing substantially simi-
lar to those in Print Shop."° The court disagreed. It pointed to
another menu-driven printing program which differed substantially
from Print Shop. 101 Because at least one alternative means of expres-
sing the idea underlying Print Shop was available, the court concluded
that merger was inapplicable.'
The Broderbund court opened the door to sweeping protection of
screen displays generated by an application program outside the realm
of videogames. However, the decision left many issues unresolved.
First, it did not clearly base this protection on the audiovisual copy-
right or the program copyright. Furthermore, because the Print Shop
interface was menu-driven, the court did not consider whether either
audiovisual or program copyright would protect a command-driven
interface. A recent case, Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v.
Softklone Distributing Corp., to3 helped clarify these questions.
II. SOFTKLONE
A. The Facts
Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing
Corp. 104 involved the infringement of the status screen of a communi-
97. 648 F. Supp. at 1133 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 1129.
99. Id. at 1132.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court did not specify precisely how the alternative program differed from Print
Shop. The court stated only that "[t]he menu screens and sequence of screens in the two
programs are different. The entire structure and organization of the user interfaces are
different." Id.
102. Id.
103. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
104. Id.
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cations program known as Crosstalk The upper portion of the screen
reflected the current status of Crosstalk's operating parameters.10 5
The lower portion of the screen contained a "window." On request,
this window displayed a partial list of the Crosstalk command terms,
which were used to change the settings displayed in the upper portion
of the screen.10 6 The screen also contained a "command line" by
which the user could change the operating parameters. 107
Digital Communication's predecessor had obtained a copyright
registration for the Crosstalk computer program. 0 8 The Copyright
Office also issued a separate registration for the Crosstalk status screen
as a "compilation of program terms."109
Softklone produced a competing communications program which it
dubbed Mirror.1 0 Mirror duplicated the Crosstalk status screen in all
material respects.1"' Softklone also used a command language with
terms nearly identical to those used by Crosstalk."2 Suit was brought
for infringement of both the program and compilation copyrights.1 3
B. The Decision
The Softklone court held that the screen displays of Crosstalk were
separately copyrightable as a compilation. Although declaring certain
elements of the Crosstalk screen to be nonprotectable, the court found
that the arrangement and highlighting of certain characters were
expression, and therefore Mirror infringed.
First, the Softklone court rejected the argument that the Mirror sta-
tus screen could infringe the Crosstalk program copyright." 4 The
court concluded that Broderbund had erroneously interpreted the
appellate decision in Whelan, and that its holding was contrary to case
authority." 5
The court then determined what elements of the Crosstalk screen, if
any, were protected by copyright. The defendants argued that the sta-
105. Id. at 452.
106. Id. at 452-53.
107. Id. "For example, if the user wishes to change the byte or baud rate (speed) of the
program to 1200, he can type and enter the two letter symbol for the byte or baud rate command
along with the rate he desires, e.g. 'SP 1200,'...." Id. at 453.
108. Id. Digital Communications purchased Microstuff, Inc., the original developer of Print
Shop. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 465.
112. See id. at 465-66.
113. Id. at 454.
114. Id. at 455-56.
115. Id.
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tus screen was a necessary expression of the idea underlying the
screen, and therefore unprotectable under the doctrine of merger.",
6
The court adopted the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Whe-
lan, and concluded that the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea.ll 7 Where there are various means of achiev-
ing the desired purpose, the particular means chosen is not necessary
to the purpose. Merger does not occur, and the expression remains
protectable.l" 8 The court held that the idea underlying the screen was
the process or manner in which the screen operates." 9
Applying this analysis to the Crosstalk screen, the court found that
certain features were nonprotectable ideas. These included the use of
a screen to reflect the status of the program, the use of a command
driven program, and the typing of two symbols to activate a specific
command.'2 0 All of these features related to "how the computer pro-
gram receives commands or instructions from the user and how opera-
tionally the computer program reflects the results of those
commands."'' The court concluded, however, that the manner in
which the command terms were presented, i.e. the arrangement and
highlighting of two characters, were unrelated to how the program
operated, and were thus protectable expression.' 2 2 Others were not
precluded from using the same set of commands if this arrangement
and highlighting were not duplicated.
2 3
Finally, the court declared that "standardization" did not require a
different result.' 24 The court concluded that the proper balance of
protection and communication (or competition) supported the
copyrightability of the arrangement and design of the status screen.12 5
III. ANALYSIS
The Softklone decision is important because it supports protection
of interface design and illustrates the advantages of separate
116. Id. at 459-60. The defendants also argued that the screen was not copyrightable because
it was a blank form, relying on Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). Because the screen conveyed
information beyond indicating where to record data, the court rejected defendant's claim that the
screen was a blank form, and upheld copyrightability. 659 F. Supp. at 460-62.
117. 659 F. Supp. at 458-59.
118. Id. at 458.
119. Id. at 459.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 462.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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copyrightability of screen displays. First, although it excluded certain
elements of the screen display as nonprotectable ideas, the court held
that the Crosstalk status screen was protected by copyright. By specif-
ically identifying nonprotectable features, the Softklone court's
approach helps to preserve competition in interface design) 2 6 Second,
the Softklone court properly rejected standardization as a reason to
deny copyrightability to interface design. 27 Third, by illustrating how
easily infringement of screen-oriented interface design may be deter-
mined when the screen displays are separately copyrightable, the Soft-
klone decision supports separate copyrightability of text-based screen
displays. 128
The major drawback in the Softklone decision is its failure to fully
protect the individual commands of Crosstalk's command language.129
The command terms are the most important aspect of the command
language. The Softklone decision would permit competitors to freely
use an identical set of command terms.
A. Scope of Protection for the User Interface
A proper balance between protection and competition is fundamen-
tal to copyright protection of computer programs and interface
design.130 Once a work is found to be copyrightable, the principal
means of preserving competition is the exclusion of ideas from copy-
right protection. 1 ' Appropriately defining the "idea" underlying
interface design is the most important step in achieving the balance
between protection and competition. The Softklone and Broderbund
decisions agree that the screen displays of application programs are
copyrightable. They differ, however, in the manner in which they
define the idea or ideas underlying screen displays.
The Broderbund decision equated the idea underlying a program's
screen displays with the idea underlying the program itself. In the
case of Print Shop, that idea was a greeting card printing program.' 32
Each interface design choice was not necessary to the expression of a
greeting card printing program as an idea, and the court found that
that idea could be expressed in an unlimited number of ways. There-
126. See infra notes 130-49 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
129, See infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
132. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see
infra note 134.
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fore, no merger occurred, and the interface was protected.'33
Although the Broderbund court would apparently permit a competing
program to utilize menus, 134 the court's very general definition of the
idea underlying the interface would compel a finding of infringement
by any greeting card printing program duplicating any of the other
interface design choices embodied in Print Shop.
By contrast, the Softklone court focused on the interface, not the
program. The court considered how the elements on screen related to
the communication between user and computer. Rather than identify-
ing a single abstract idea underlying the work, the court found that
several distinct interface elements were unprotected ideas.' 35 Thus,
the use of a screen to reflect the status of the program, the use of a
command-driven program, and the typing of two symbols to activate a
specific command were all ideas. 136  The court then determined
whether the remaining expression was infringed." 7
The Softklone court's approach is preferable to that employed in
Broderbund for two reasons. First, the Softklone court properly
focused its inquiry on the screen display, the work alleged to have been
infringed. Second, the court's approach provides a more certain basis
for preserving competition in interface design while still maintaining
protection.
Copyright protects only identifiable "works" of authorship. 3 ' The
screen displays and the underlying program constitute separate
works, 39 and each should be judged on its own merits. The idea
underlying the displays is undeniably linked to that underlying the
program. However, the screen performs a unique function. It com-
municates with the user. In determining what idea or ideas underlie
the screen displays, one must consider how this communication is
accomplished. The nature of interface design suggests that, at a basic
133. Id.
134. In Broderbund, the defendant argued that idea and expression had merged because
'[a]ny menu-driven computer program that allows its users to print greeting cards... will have a
user interface substantially similar" to that in plaintiff's program. Id. It may be inferred that the
Broderbund court acceded to defendant's definition as including the choice of basic interface
style, i.e. the use of menus, because, in rejecting the merger argument, the court pointed to
another, presumably non-infringing, menu-driven greeting card program. Id. This illustrates the
elasticity-and therefore unpredictability-of the Broderbund approach. See infra note 142 and
accompanying text.
135. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 459 (N.D. Ga.
1987).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 459-60.
138. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
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level, the means of establishing this communication are strictly lim-
ited. For example, there are only three basic interface styles: menus,
command languages, and interactive design." ° Furthermore, even
within a given interface style, design choices may be very limited. For
example, if developers choose to use menus, they have limited means
of prompting the user for a response (e.g. a command line, or input of
a number or mnemonic combination of letters).' If the "idea"
underlying a screen display is so general that these various choices are
considered expression, the effect is to materially constrict the interface
designs available to competitors. The Softklone court maintains com-
petition by refusing copyright protection to basic design choices.
The Softklone approach also has the virtue of certainty. Under
Broderbund, competitors could not predict with certainty whether a
court would choose to include various design choices within the
"idea" underlying a program. By defining specific design choices as
nonprotectable, the Softklone decision and courts adopting its
approach will resolve this problem and provide competitors with "safe
havens" against infringement.14
2
Having determined which interface design choices constitute ideas
and which constitute expression, the question of the scope of protec-
tion to be afforded to the expression remains unanswered. Copyright
has consistently recognized that the scope of protection afforded
depends upon the range of expression available.'43 If the means of
expression is limited, a court will require near verbatim copying before
finding infringement."M Because the infringing works at issue in
Broderbund and Softklone were nearly identical to the infringed
works, neither court had to determine how far beyond literal copying
protection of screen displays extends.
Studies conducted in the last decade indicate that interface design
140. Cf B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1, at 57-60. Form fill-in, listed as a separate
interaction style by Shneiderman, is treated as a special kind of menu. Id. at 122-28.
141. Cf. id. at 117-20.
142. If a court identifies only one idea underlying a program, it is impossible to predict
whether any given interface technique is included, and hence nonprotected. Ideally, the line
between idea and expression should be drawn at the point which best maintains a balance
between protection and competition. However, as the videogame cases illustrate, courts have not
been consistent in drawing this line even with comparable subject matter. Compare Atari, Inc. v.
North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982) with Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981). Raymond
Nimmer attributes the difference in result reached by the North Am. Philips and Amusement
World courts to the different level of abstraction used by each court in defining the idea
underlying the game. R. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1.07, at 1-48 (1985).
143. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
144. Id.
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choices may be limited in many respects.145 For example, such factors
as the expected frequency of use and expertise of the intended user
group will have an impact on interface design.' 4 6 At a basic level, an
experienced user may become frustrated with the inflexibility and
slowness of a menu-driven program and prefer the speed of a com-
mand language. Similarly, an infrequent novice user may not remem-
ber commands from one session to the next, and may require
prompting.' 47  Human engineering considerations may also limit
choice of wording, menu structure, and screen presentation of
information.' 48
Considerations of efficiency, ease of understanding, and skill reten-
tion may all act to limit the viable interface choices available.' 49 To
preserve competition, only viable design choices should be considered
in determining the range of expression available. 5 0 If a defendant can
show that the range of expression is limited, infringement should be
found only where copying is verbatim.
B. Standardization
The defense in Softklone argued that the need for "standardization"
in the software industry justified denial of copyright protection to
interface design, as opposed to the program code. The court's discus-
sion of the standardization issue is brief, and the rationale advanced in
favor of standardization is by no means clear. s' However, the court's
145. See, e.g., B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1; FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN-COMPUTER
INTERACTION (A. Monk ed. 1985).
146. B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1, at 53-55.
147. The Library of Congress's experience with its computerized catalog illustrates this
problem. The program was first designed for use by professional staff members. Three- to six-
hour training sessions were given to staff members. In 1981, the Library stopped updating its
manual card catalog, requiring the general public to use the computerized version. The system,
using a command language, proved too difficult for the ordinary public to use. The lesson was
apparent: "The SCORPIO system that worked so well for one community of users was
inappropriate for this new community." Id. at 13-14. Consequently, the system was revised to
provide feedback and on-line tutorial help. Id. at 14.
148. See generally B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1,passin (gathering and reporting results of
studies of human engineering considerations in interface design).
149. Id.
150. Cf R. NiMMER, supra note 142, 1.03[2] at 1-14 (arguing that efficiency limitations on
programming choices should limit scope of protection afforded programs).
151. Without identifying the rationale advanced by defendants, the Softklone court noted that
the argument was "similar to the one rejected in Whalen [sic], 797 F.2d at 1238 ('we are not
convinced that progress in computer technology or technique is qualitatively different from
progress in other areas of science or the arts') .... ." Digital Communications Assocs. v.
Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 462 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In the quoted statement, the Whelan
court responded to the argument that copyright protection should not extend beyond a
prohibition against verbatim copying. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d
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conclusion that standardization has no bearing on the scope of copy-
right protection afforded interface design is valid.
In essence, the argument for standardization is one for permitting
the development of "clones." A "clone" is a program which dupli-
cates the user interface of another program, typically a market leader.
The user interfaces are identical. To the user, the programs are inter-
changeable. However, the program code is entirely distinct to avoid
infringing any copyright in the market leader's code. Both
Broderbund and Softklone illustrate this phenomenon." 2
Clone manufacturers argue that leaving the interface unprotected
encourages the development of underlying programs and serves the
public interest by allowing the development of arguably better153 and
frequently less expensive 154 competing programs with common inter-
faces. 155 Because the skills learned on one program are transferable to
another, a user does not need to waste time learning the new program.
The user's choice of program will then be dictated by the program's
functionality, not by the user's familiarity with the interface. Of
course, clone manufacturers also receive a generous market benefit.
Copying an existing interface permits developers to avoid the expense
of developing their own interfaces, and provides them with a ready
market of users already trained to use the new product.' 56
1222, 1237-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986). The defendants' argument was not,
as it was in Softklone, that copyright protection ought to be denied to a work altogether. The
argument to which the Whelan court's comment appears to be directed was that overbroad
protection would retard development of new computer programs. 797 F.2d at 1238.
152. Both Crosstalk and Print Shop were very successful programs. Broderbund Software v.
Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Print Shop sold 500,000 copies prior to
trial); Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 452. In Broderbund, the defendants had begun development of
an IBM version of Print Shop during licensing negotiations with Broderbund. They instructed
their programmer to duplicate Print Shop as nearly as possible. When negotiations failed, the
defendants retained the copied screen displays. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1130-31. In
Softklone, the defendant duplicated the Crosstalk screen on advice of counsel that the status
screen was nonprotectable. 659 F. Supp. at 453.
153. The competing program may be faster. It may also offer more functions. For example, a
competitor may add a spelling checker or automatic hyphenation to a word processing program.
154. In a recent advertisement, for example, Softklone offered Mirror for $69.95; by
comparison, the list price for Crosstalk was $195. PC CLONES, Premier Edition 1987, at 8.
155. See, e.g., supra note 7.
156. A similar debate has taken place between manufacturers of computers. New entrants
have striven to attain compatibility with the operating systems of well-established competitors to
gain access to the wide variety of applications software written specifically for established
systems. See, eg., Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant
alleged copying of systems programs was required to permit its computers to run third-party
applications programs written for plaintiff's computers), aff'g, 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal.
1983); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (same), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); cf. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485
(D. Minn. 1985) (alleging identity of "barker code," "H-matrix" was necessary to make
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The proponents of standardization do not argue that other, nonin-
fringing interface designs cannot accomplish the same functional
result. If this were the case, traditional copyright doctrine would sup-
port an argument that any such interface design ought not be pro-
tected because of merger, or should be protected at most from
verbatim copying."'
The standardization argument fundamentally conflicts with the pol-
icies underlying copyright, and was properly rejected by the Softklone
court. Copyright seeks to provide authors sufficient protection to
encourage them to develop new works. Although refusing protection
to interface design arguably encourages competition in program
design, it also discourages development of new interface designs.
Interface design requires a substantial investment in time and
money.' 58 Without protection, developers will not expend the
extraordinary effort required to create a new interface design. Fur-
thermore, because the user interface is the determinative factor in the
marketability of a program, 5 9 standardization endangers a developer's
ability to recoup expenses incurred in development of the program as
well.
C Text-Based Screen Displays
Screen displays incorporating graphic material are presently sepa-
rately copyrightable as audiovisual works. 160  Separate copyright-
ability of text-based screens was upheld in Softklone as a "compilation
of program terms."' 16' Softkione illustrates the ease with which
infringement is determined when the screen displays are separately
defendant's radios compatible with plaintiff's repeaters); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605
F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (defendant alleged similarity was necessary to make its program
upwardly compatible with plaintiff's).
The courts uniformly rejected the contention that compatibility per se excused copying; the
question was whether other programs could accomplish the same function. The Franklin
Computer court observed that "total compatibility with independently developed application
programs written for the Apple II" was "a commercial and competitive objective which does not
enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have
merged." 714 F.2d at 1253.
157. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
158. For example, Xerox employees "devoted about thirty work- years to the design of the
Star user interface. It was designed before the functionality of the system was fully decided. It
was even designed before the computer hardware was built. We worked for two years before we
wrote a single line of actual product software." Smith, Irby, Kimball, Verplank & Harslen,
Designing the Star User Interface. BYTE, Apr. 1982, at 242, 246 (emphasis in original).
159. See supra note 3.
160. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
161. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 462-63 (N.D.
Ga. 1987).
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copyrightable. However, the separate copyrightability of text-based
screen displays is now in doubt because of the Copyright Office's dec-
laration that it will no longer separately register text-based screens on
the theory that text-based screens are already protected by the pro-
gram registration.162 That policy is now under review.163 Given the
importance of the interface, both text-based and graphic screens
should be separately copyrightable.
The Copyright Office's position that the program copyright protects
text-based screen displays poses problems for interface protection.
First, its position is inconsistent with the 1980 computer software
amendments to the Copyright Act and prior case law.' Second, the
denial of separate registration materially affects the ability of develop-
ers to prove infringement of text- based displays. Presumably,
infringement will require substantial similarity in program code rather
than visual similarity of the screens in question, since program
infringement actions focus on analysis of the program code.1 65 A
plaintiff seeking to prove infringement of a text-based screen will have
to show not only similarity of code, but also that the similarities are
sufficiently important, quantitatively or qualitatively, to constitute
improper appropriation. 166 Furthermore, program infringement cases
are complex, requiring the admission of expert testimony and dissec-
162. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. This rationale would seem to apply equally to
graphic displays, since the program contains the instructions required to generate a graphic
display. The Copyright Office, however, has not refused to separately register graphic displays as
audiovisual works.
In noncomputer contexts, works wholly encompassed within other works have been found
separately copyrightable. For example, an illustration may be copyrighted although within a
book. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
163. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
165. The Copyright Office notice to Lotus Development Corp. is unclear on this point. One
possible interpretation of the policy is that separate registration is merely redundant in an
administrative sense; that is, the single registration extends protection to two separate works,
which are then considered independently in an infringement action. However, program
infringement actions have always focused on similarity of program code. See, e.g., Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986);
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985); SAS Inst. v. S &
H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
The Copyright Office is undertaking a review of its registration policies. Supra note 62.
Denial of separate registrability appears to assume that on-screen text is a part of the underlying
program, see supra note 61, so that actions for infringement of text-based screens would be
dominated by program code analysis.
However, the Copyright Office's review also encompasses the issue of appropriate deposit
requirements. Supra note 62. If separate deposit of screen displays is permitted, the issue of
separate registrability may be of little consequence if the courts then permit infringement actions
to proceed on the basis of visual comparison rather than program code analysis.
166. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
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tion of the program, thereby increasing the cost of bringing suit.167
The importance of user interface design justifies separate registra-
tion of both text-based and graphic screens as audiovisual works
because separate registration simplifies infringement analysis. The
classifications established by the Act were intended to be illustrative,
not exclusive.1 68 The range of copyrightable works was intended to be
broad. 169 The "images" required for an audiovisual work 7 ° could be
interpreted to include text. One court has held that an audiovisual
copyright of a work otherwise consisting of graphic images will also
protect any accompanying text. 17 1  Properly designed text-based
screens are of great value in interface design. 1 72 Permitting separate
registration of graphic screens and text-based screens incorporating
sufficient graphic material while denying separate registration to
wholly text-based screens is unjustified. Denying separate registration
to all screens would seriously impair a developer's efforts to prove
infringement.
D. Copyright Protection of Command Languages
Softkione involved infringement of a "compilation of program
terms." The court found infringement based upon the manner in
which the command language terms were presented on screen, e.g.
placement and highlighting of the first two characters of each com-
mand term. The court refused to bar others from using identical com-
mand terms if their on-screen presentation was sufficiently distinct.'7 3
167. Dissection and expert testimony were prominently featured in Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1986); E.F. Johnson Co.
v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys.,
605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
168. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 53.
169. Id. at 51.
170. Supra note 33.
171. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
This was true even though the text and graphics did not appear on screen simultaneously. Id. at
628- 29.
172. See generally B. SHNEIDERMAN,SUpra note I, at 69-72, 110-16, 162-65, 326-36, 342-50
(noting factors in effective screen design); see also id. at 199-201 (noting disadvantages of graphic
displays vis-A-vis textual displays).
173. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 460-62 (N.D.
Ga. 1987). Because the terms in Sofiklone were displayed on screen, the court was not faced
with the task of deciding whether a program which accepted an identical command language, but
did not display the command terms on screen, could be found to infringe another program's
command language. The court nonetheless stated that no infringement would be found. Id. at
460. In doing so, the court relied upon Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing
Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
In Synercom, the defendant wrote a preprocessing program designed to accept data
punchcards formatted identically to those accepted by Synercom's program. Id. at 1012.
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The court erred by not extending protection to the command terms
themselves. Individually, command terms are likely not copyrightable
because they do not meet the threshold quantum of creativity required
of copyrightable works. 174  However, copyright protects compila-
tions, 75 even where the individual components of the compilation are
not copyrightable. 176 The protection afforded extends not only to
presentation but also to selection of the items included in a
compilation.
177
The idea of a command language and the particular set of command
terms used to implement this idea are conceptually distinct. 78 While
a command language represents one of only a limited number of basic
interface styles,17 9 the number of possible combinations of command
terms is practically limitless. 180 Permitting one developer to monopo-
lize one command set would not endanger the opportunity of other
developers to create other command sets."' Furthermore, the devel-
Synercom claimed that the preprocessor infringed its copyright in a manual which contained an
illustration of a format card. Id. The Synercom court denied infringement because it found the
sequence of data entry was nonprotectable either because it was an idea or because of merger. Id.
at 1012-14.
In Softklone, the court stated that no infringement would have occurred had the defendant's
program simply accepted all of the same commands utilized by the plaintiff without displaying
them on screen. 659 F. Supp. at 460. It reasoned that the defendants would have only
appropriated Crosstalk's idea (the command terms), not its expression (the on-screen
presentation). Id.
The Softklone court's reliance on Synercom is unfounded. The Synercom decision is grounded
on its finding that the appropriated matter (the sequence of data entry) is nonprotectable.
Assuming that the Softklone court is wrong in holding command terms to be nonprotectable, see
infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text, Synercom is inapposite. If the terms are protectable,
a court should proceed to determine whether the program codes are substantially similar and
hence infringing.
174. Simple words and phrases have been denied copyright for lack of sufficient creativity or
originality. See supra note 30.
175. Supra note 34.
176. See, eg., Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (L. Hand, J.);
see also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 809
(11th Cir. 1985) (Atlanta yellow pages); Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp.
650, 654-55 (N.D. I1. 1974) (calendar and appointment book; composite copyrightable although
constituent parts in public domain), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1975).
177. See, eg., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5-6 (5th Cir. 1977)
(gardening directory); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937). Protection
will depend upon the amount of effort or judgment that went into the compilation. Cf Toro Co.
v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986).
178. Cf. Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1212 (distinguishing idea of "parts numbering system" from its
embodiment in particular set of numbers).
179. Supra note 140.
180. The number of variations will depend upon the number of functions to be performed and
the viable alternative terms available for each function.
181. Cf Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1212.
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opment of a particular command language involves considerable
creativity. 1"2
In Softklone, the command terms should have been protected. The
defendant did not show that the compilation was not original as a
whole.'8 3 Furthermore, Softklone did not show that another set of
command terms could not perform the same function equally well, so
merger did not apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
User interface design is critical to the market success of computer
programs. Protection ought to be afforded in such a way that proof of
infringement is easy and predictable. By identifying specific nonpro-
tectable elements, the Softklone decision extended copyright protec-
tion to the screen displays generated by the program in a manner
which assures that such protection will not unduly hamper competi-
tion. The court properly rejected the argument that standardization
should independently act as a limitation on the scope of protection
afforded. Standardization would destroy the incentive to invest in
interface design. The court erred, however, in failing to fully protect
the infringed program's command language.
Softklone also illustrates the importance of separate registration in
proving infringement. Given the significance of interface design, sepa-
rate registration of both text-based and graphic screens ought to be
encouraged. The Copyright Office should reconsider its refusal to sep-
arately register text-based screens.
Alan S. Middleton
182. The choice of individual command terms is not haphazard. Efficiency and ease of user
recall will substantially affect a well-designed command set. B. SHNEIDERNIAN, supra note 1, at
136-72.
183. There was evidence that some of the individual command terms had been in use prior to
Crosstalk's creation. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449,
463 (N.D. Ga. 1987). Since copyright only protects original works from copying, it was of
course open to Softklone to argue either that the compilation was not original (i.e., that it was
not copyrightable) or that it did not copy Crosstalk but instead copied the command terms from
a common source (i.e., did not infringe one of the rights secured by copyright).
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